BARCELONA ASTRAL PROJECTION CLINIC

Once again the Central Intelligence Agency, the Big Museum, and the Abstract Expressionist secret agents want to nerf comrades across the globe. A state propaganda show disguised as a cultural beacon infects the canon once again under the guise of Miró and his friends make work to posit the United States as the Mecca of art. In order to understand why the AbEx works exhibited within the show are nothing but weapons, we must understand the history behind this tool of sheer propaganda. This is not a review of the show. That would be redundant and further fit into the machine of lukewarm art critics who “facilitate a juxtaposition between the dichotomy of the ennui and critique a preconceived hierarchy of cultural values and assumptions of artistic worth”. This is an essay, an essay to let you know of the horrors the CIA committed with these works.

The decision to include culture and art in the Cold War arsenal of the United States was taken as soon as the Central Intelligence Agency started operating on September 18th, 1947. Although World War II was not long over, two world powers were at ideological loggerheads, The United States with capitalism battling the Soviet Union and communism for ideological domination. 

For what reason did the CIA back artistic and cultural projects in order to establish intellectual superiority against the Soviet Union? Such endeavours could be used to establish the cultural might of the US in the broader propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. Artistic endeavors provided evidence of the US’s inventiveness and intellectual independence. The Soviet ideological straitjacket prevented Russian art from competing, giving the United States a boost on their front of the cultural war. The goal was to parade the west’s aesthetic excellence and intellectual superiority. Although this was not a noble goal, it was crucial to the formation of the CIA and the fight against the Cold War.

In order to lay the groundwork for this, one has to set the established binaries between Abstract Expressionism coming out of the United States and Social Realism, coming out of the Soviet Union. In 1934, the Soviet Union formally prohibited abstract art, declaring Socialist Realism to be the only permissible form of artistic expression. This order followed a series of prohibitions that had already reduced the viability of abstract painting from the early 1920s. Previously, prominent artists such as Kazimir Malevich and Wassily Kandinsky led a thriving movement in Russia that stretched the bounds of artistic expression. However, when the government attempted to connect art with socialist principles, the emphasis shifted toward works that expressed a strong social message, leaving little leeway for individual originality or experimentation. Such an approach towards artistic expression differed significantly from the aforementioned approach that the United States took, fostering a foundation for artistic experimentation and abstraction alike.

The lack of published standards for what qualified as acceptable art further exacerbated the issue. Party officials could only assess an artist's work after it was finished and make a determination about its conformity to Socialist Realist ideals. What one set of bureaucrats may view as ideologically sound may be viewed by another as corrupt and misguided. As a result of confusion surrounding adherence to party standards, artists grew increasingly conservative over time in order to conform with the requests of the party.

This interest of the CIA in weaponizing art against the Soviet Union became a vital part of twentieth-century art history in the US because of the role it played in the acclaim of Abstract Expressionism in broader contexts. It has now been established that the CIA fostered Abstract Expressionism, arguably the most well known avant-garde movement in painting and sculpture after World War II. Its leading artists were Willem de Kooning (b. 1904 – d. 1997), Mark Rothko (b. 1903 – d. 1970), and Jackson Pollock (b. 1912 – d. 1956). They were members of the same collective, the New York School, an interdisciplinary, avant-garde movement of artists active in New York City in the ‘50s and ’60s. The New York School encompasses Abstract Expressionism and the terms are sometimes used interchangeably. 

A month after his election as president of the Museum of Modern Art, John Hay Whitney outlined a plan to inaugurate a new program to speed the interchange of art and culture in the western hemisphere on February 28, 1941. Who, however, was John Hay Whitney? John Hay Whitney (b. 1904 – d. 1982) was a sportsman, investor, publisher, philanthropist, political mover and ambassador to the United Kingdom with a diversified and influential outreach in global and domestic affairs alike. Mr. Whitney’s statement was the focal point of his address regarding nothing less than the role of a museum in national defense. In this address – predating the CIA by six years – Mr. Whitney saw art as an essential force for fostering cultural cooperation in the western hemisphere. He stated that the initial media employed in the new program will be the motion picture as he wanted to leverage the resources of the Museum’s Film Library. He followed his statement by exclaiming that painting, sculpture, industrial design, graphic arts, architecture, and music would also be included in the program. In addition, he said that plans were already underway to present several traveling exhibitions of paintings by North American artists in prominent cities of Central and South America, with more details on such matters to surface in the near future. This address shows that even during World War II, art was already part of the weapon arsenal of the United States.

Historian and journalist Frances Stonor Saunders highlights the clandestine manner in which the CIA engaged in Abstract Expressionism. Why was this secrecy essential? It is vital to emphasize that it was not just for deceiving the Soviet Union. The clandestine manner was for ensuring that the involved artists remained uninformed on the use of their work for political purposes. At the outset, this review emphasized that the CIA wanted to show that the US promoted the qualities that produced successful artistic endeavors: that is, inventiveness and intellectual superiority. This independence would disappear if the artists became informed. The situation is summed up in an important opinion Stonor Saunders includes in her article. It is from former CIA officer Donald Jameson, a branch chief in the Central Intelligence Agency's directorate of operations who was highly regarded for his work handling Russian defectors and other Soviet covert operations. According to Jameson, “Matters of this sort could only have been done at two or three removes, so that there wouldn't be any question of having to clear Jackson Pollock, for example, or do anything that would involve these people in the organisation. And it couldn't have been any closer, because most of them were people who had very little respect for the government, in particular, and certainly none for the CIA. If you had to use people who considered themselves one way or another to be closer to Moscow than to Washington, well, so much the better perhaps”.

How did the agency keep artists uniformed? The CIA’s solution to said issue was referred to as the long-leash policy. Stonor Saunders argues that this arrangement maintained a distance of two or three degrees between CIA personnel and the artists involved in CIA-sponsored art exhibitions. Therefore any association of Abstract Expressionism with covert federal funding had to be prevented. Along with the aforementioned arrangement, the initial recruitment policy of the CIA prevented such association.

In ties with the long-leash policy and what role the artists served to the CIA, it is important to mention that in many cases, artists did not produce work with a political purpose in mind. A prominent characteristic of Abstract Expressionist works was the lack of identifiable or representational subject matter, and consequently, any discernible political affiliation.  Considering an emphasis on the artist's agency, as exemplified by Stonor Saunders' assertion that it is hard to sustain the argument that the Abstract Expressionists merely “happened to be painting in the Cold War and not for the Cold War”, the artist's political associations would subsequently warrant historical scrutiny.  

Harold Rosenberg, a prominent art critic and advocate of Abstract Expressionism, presents an argument rooted in individualism emphasizing the artist’s personal agency in relation to Abstract Expressionism. Rosenberg contends that the new “American Action Painters” were distinguished by their “consciousness of a function for a painting,” subtly suggesting the potential political dimension of Abstract Expressionists. Nevertheless, this interpretation of Abstract Expressionism can be deemed as inaccurate. His assertion that the “act-painting is of the same metaphysical substance as the artist’s existence” conflicts with the general premise that Abstract Expressionism did not hold any political charge. It indicates that the artist's work is inherently intertwined with biographical influences, and consequently, that it is impossible to produce creations with meanings or motivations distinct from those shaped by their artistic background.

Furthermore, when considering Abstract Expressionism within the context of the Cold War, this argument undermines those of Stonor Saunders. Jackson Pollock had formerly been involved in the studios of artists supported by the Communist party. He had also collaborated with Mexican muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros, a member of the Mexican Communist Party and an advocate of Stalinism. Had Pollock’s artistic career been intertwined with his work, Rosenberg might have interpreted his art as “communistic”. New York School artists were more likely to be focused on establishing the first internationally influential American artistic movement than on employing their art as a tool for propaganda. This action was instead carried out by those in authority. Therefore, we must regard the artist and the influencer as operating within distinct yet overlapping domains.

Coming back to the CIA, during its formation it recruited graduates with cultivated interests in the arts. The popular image of the CIA and the FBI from the decades of the 1930s on to the 1960s is associated with a political world ruled by McCarthyism, a campaign that spread fear of Soviet espionage in the United States and communist and Soviet influence on American institutions. It was characterized by the political persecution and repression of left-wing individuals from the late 1940s to the 1950s and was named after Joseph McCarthy, a republican senator from Wisconsin. In addition to the American political landscape being ruled by the former, J. Edgar Hoover’s 48 year-long reign as director of the FBI maintained a covert domestic police and intelligence organization in an open society from 1924 to 1972. In order to maintain his conservative worldview, Hoover used illegal methods, including secret surveillance, to manipulate politicians and infiltrate and dismantle domestic political organizations. What the CIA was doing in 1946 was a far cry from this image. The agency recruited agents from institutions like Yale and Harvard. That was because these universities included many students who appreciated art or even wrote novels as forms of leisure.

Because of this background, such agents befriended artists, granting them the ability to act as undercover patrons of the arts. Another way to address the demand for secrecy was when the CIA engaged arts foundations, artist’s groups, and, most importantly, art institutions, soliciting their support in creating special exhibitions, events, and collections. Findings made in governmental sources themselves are also relevant, for example, from the records of the CIA as studied by researcher Michael Warner. To demonstrate how these researchers showed that Abstract Expressionism helped establish and parade American cultural might, this survey next describes their focus on a number of vital institutions.  

The first of these was the Propaganda Assets Inventory. Here again, the research of Stonor Saunders revealed the role and importance of the Propaganda Assets Inventory. Although it was not really an institution, it functioned like one. When still a new agency, the CIA established the Propaganda Assets Inventory as a division within the organization. The reason for said action was that, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the CIA was concerned with the enduring allure of communism among numerous intellectuals and artists in the West, especially the US. According to Stonor Saunders, at its zenith the Propaganda Assets Inventory could sway over 800 newspapers, periodicals, and public information organizations.  

The second institution was the International Organisations Division. Again, the information on it surfaces from the research of Stonor Saunders. Three years after the CIA was founded, the establishment of the International Organisations Division was a key development that occurred in the agency’s cultural Cold War against the Soviet Union. The establishment of the International Organisations Division took place in 1950 under the leadership of Tom Braden, a former operative and MoMA’s executive secretary from 1948-1949 who joined the CIA in 1950 and was involved in an agency operation to counter Communist influence in Europe through arts programs. Braden was quoted in a Saturday Evening Post article stating that art coming out of the United States “won more acclaim for the U.S. …than John Foster Dulles or Dwight D. Eisenhower could have bought with a hundred speeches.” Braden’s involvement and attitude towards art and its powers paved the path for all activities the CIA trekked upon. Crucially, the International Organisations Division used its powers in funding American jazz musicians, opera performances, and the international touring program of the Boston Symphony Orchestra. Its operatives were also positioned within the film industry and publishing firms.

The third institution was the International Program, a department established by the Museum of Modern Art in 1952. This founding moment reminds us of the importance that figures like Whitney played in the history of CIA support for Abstract Expressionism. That is because a figure akin to Whitney was involved with the International Program, namely Nelson Rockefeller (b. 1908 – d. 1979), who served as a former trustee and president of the Museum of Modern Art,. The International Program was supported through a five-year grant from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, showing Rockerfeller’s instrumental contributions to art. Stonor Saunders notes upon the contributions of Rockerfeller in her article. Again, Stonor Saunders emerges as essential to understanding Abstract Expressionism in relation to the CIA. She states that “Rockefeller was one of the biggest backers of Abstract Expressionism”. It is important to emphasize the reasons why he was “one of the biggest backers” of the movement because they show his support for capitalism in the US against the communist system of the Soviet Union. Rockefeller called Abstract Expressionism “free enterprise painting”.

Five years later, after the International Program was founded, the Museum of Modern Art continues through with its involvement. It is at this point that a fourth organization becomes relevant, one connected to the International Program. It is the International Council, notably at MoMA, which was established in 1956. The International Council’s mission was to support the International Program. It was a group of art patrons and community leaders from various parts of the US. The International Council’s financial contributions, ongoing support from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and supplementary funding acquired for initiatives enabled the International Program to augment and broaden its activities. The purpose of the International Council was to initiate art exhibition exchanges so that American cultural achievements could be better known abroad and the art of other nations brought to the United States in order to enrich one’s understanding of culture.

There is yet another, fifth organization that was part of the CIA’s “long-leash” policy, one interconnected with the others, the Congress for Cultural Freedom. As such interests of weaponizing art against the Soviet Union formulate, a plan to conduct travelling exhibitions across the western sphere of influence takes place. At this point, it is important to underline that Stonor Saunder’s claims about Abstract Expressionism’s success in the cultural Cold War is made on the basis of a vital piece of evidence, the idea of the travelling exhibition. Because the Congress for Cultural Freedom was ultimately behind such shows, it is given separate consideration. It becomes apparent that the centerpiece of the CIA campaign – from 1947 onwards – in support of Abstract Expressionism became the Congress for Cultural Freedom. It is at this point that the long-leash policy should be remembered, tying into the demand for secrecy. A vital finding by Stonor Saunders is that the Congress for Cultural Freedom provided the CIA with secrecy making it an ideal platform to promote the CIA’s covert interest in Abstract Expressionism.

It is therefore vital to describe the Congress for Cultural Freedom. It was a team of intellectuals, writers, historians, poets, and artists that participated in an organization set up with CIA funds in 1950 and run by CIA agents. Thus the Congress for Cultural Freedom continued the secrecy highlighted by Stonor Saunders as she outlined the functions of the Congress for Cultural Freedom. According to her, the organization was quite loose, characterizing it as a “vast jamboree of intellectuals, writers, historians, poets, and artists.”

But the Congress for Cultural Freedom served as the bastion. It was from that bastion that culture could be safeguarded against the assaults of Moscow and its Western sympathizers. At its peak, the Congress for Cultural Freedom operated offices in thirty five countries and published over twenty periodicals and journals such as Encounter that was published from 1953 to 1991. Such journals would serve as valuable venues for critics sympathetic to modern American painting and no one, including the artists, would be the wiser.

As we have seen, Stonor Saunders leaves us in no doubt about the CCF. She shows how the CCF provided the CIA with an optimal facade to advance its interest in Abstract Expressionism. That interest had to remain clandestine, indicating that the CIA developed the long-leash policy. SS shows how when it took effect, neither the artists nor anyone else were aware of it.

The most explicit and effective demonstration of Abstract Expressionism's utilization as a Cold War instrument was during the American National Exhibition held at Moscow's Sokolniki Park in 1959. The exhibition attracted approximately 3 million visitors and showcased Abstract Expressionists like Jackson Pollock among others. The exhibition’s open sponsorship by the United States Information Agency, which was devoted to propaganda, is significant. The USIA was established in 1953 with a leading focus in promoting a favorable view of the United States for international audiences. Through the accounts of former director of USIA’s Television and Film Service, Alvin A. Snyder and his book “Warriors of Disinformation: How Lies, Videotape, and the USIA Won the Cold War” reveals the various propaganda campaigns sent out by the United States during the Cold War, including the exhibition in Sokolniki Park.

According to Abstract Expressionist historian Ellen G. Landau, the USIA helped censor the work of  “avowed communists…or persons who publicly refuse to answer questions of Congressional committees regarding connection with the communist movement.” Almost anything could be considered a potential target for congressional pot-shots. This substantiates conventional interpretations that highlight the function of Abstract Expressionism as a strategic instrument during the Cold War. Critics had effectively cultivated a link between Abstract Expressionism and the values of the American psyche, leading the state to endorse it.

Historian Marilyn S. Kushner in her journal “Exhibiting Art at the American National Exhibition in Moscow, 1959” states that despite works from Jackson Pollock being registered as grotesque and mocking to the spectator, the art at the exhibition was seen as a “manifestation of a free society, much as was originally intended by the USIA.” Pollock’s forceful application of paint, his subdued color pallet, and his non-representational subject matter may have played a role in fostering Soviet disapproval.

Initially, there was the development of a culture that was inherently anti-communist and, consequently, opposed to Socialist Realism. This led to the widespread dissemination among American art critics of the belief that Abstract Expressionism was the preeminent movement. Subsequently, there was an assertive physical exportation and exhibition of the artworks throughout Europe, in the case of “The New American Painting” and the American National Exhibition in Moscow in the late 1950s, aimed at enticing western intellectuals with the purported advantages of capitalism. These currents were mutually reinforcing, strengthening the notion that art could serve a political purpose. Regardless of the US government's success in its psychological warfare against the Soviet Union, the assertion that Abstract Expressionism served as a tool in Cold War strategies remains plausible, according to the evidence highlighted throughout this essay.